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ARBITRARILY SELECTING BLACK
ARBITRATORS
Michael Z. Green*
Calls for increased diversity among arbitrators have surged with the
growth of the employer movement, so-called mandatory arbitration, which
requires employees to agree to arbitrate employment discrimination matters
as a condition of employment. Despite good-faith efforts by neutral service
providers, civil rights organizations, bar associations, and employer and
employee groups to identify and address the need for more diverse
arbitrators in mandatory arbitration, many commentators still lament that
this diversity problem reflects negatively on access to justice. With the
#MeToo movement’s focus in recent years on the lack of a public and
transparent resolution for sexual harassment matters, as well as rap music
mogul Jay-Z’s late 2018 effort to identify more black arbitrator candidates
for his commercial arbitration matter, concerns about the lack of diversity
among arbitrators have become even more prominent.
However, the core of the problem remains: despite efforts to increase
diversity in arbitrator pools, parties still have discretion to select the
arbitrator. Businesses (and even, to some extent, employees) have no
incentive to select an arbitrator solely because of the arbitrator’s diversity
profile. Representatives for businesses and employees want to win. They
believe that result is best achieved by selecting arbitrators they know. Risk
aversion prevents those representatives from selecting unfamiliar black and
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the Symposium entitled Achieving Access to Justice Through ADR: Fact or Fiction?, hosted
by the Fordham Law Review, Fordham Law School’s Conflict Resolution and ADR Program,
and the National Center for Access to Justice on November 1, 2019, at Fordham University
School of Law. I would like to thank the Texas A&M summer research grant program for its
support and students Aarika Johnson, Brianda Curry, and Ryan Grant for providing diligent
research to assist me in completing this Article. I also thank Professor Jacqueline Nolan-Haley
and the Fordham Law Review for inviting me to participate in the Symposium. I am grateful
for the insightful comments of Charles Sullivan and Steven Willborn given when I presented
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other nonwhite, male arbitrators, despite ongoing diversity efforts to
populate arbitrator pools with more of these individuals.
This Article explores how this “win first” dynamic hinders attempts to
address arbitrator diversity and suggests a different approach by neutral
service providers that mimics the selection of federal judges. This new
selection process will involve the creation of a pool of diverse arbitrators
with outstanding qualifications. Then, instead of having the parties choose
the actual arbitrator, a neutral service provider will select the arbitrator
assigned to the parties in a random manner, similar to how federal courts
assign judges to cases without party input.
INTRODUCTION
“[A]rbitration procedures, and specifically its roster of neutrals[,] . . .
deprive black litigants like Mr. [Shawn] Carter and his companies of the
equal protection of the laws, equal access to public accommodations, and
mislead consumers into believing that they will receive a fair and impartial
adjudication.”1
This quote, from a November 2018 filing2 in New York State court by rap
artist and entertainment mogul Shawn C. Carter, also known as Jay-Z, placed
a celebrity spotlight on a perennial problem: the lack of black3 arbitrators.
With little improvement in arbitrator diversity despite longstanding criticism,
the topic received a major visibility boost after Jay-Z raised the issue.4 In a
1. Petitioners’ Memorandum of Law in Support of the Order to Show Cause for a
Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction at 2, Carter v. Iconix Brand Grp., Inc.,
No. 655894/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 28, 2018) [hereinafter Petitioners’ Memorandum].
2. Similar language appears in Jay-Z’s petition to stay arbitration. CPLR § 7503(b)
Petition to Stay Arbitration at 3, Carter, No. 655894/2018 [hereinafter Petition].
3. The terms “black” and “African American” are used interchangeably herein. While
focusing on “black” arbitrators, this Article recognizes that issues of race are not just subject
to the “black/white binary paradigm” and apply to all people of color. See Juan F. Perea, The
Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science” of American Racial Thought,
85 CALIF. L. REV. 1213, 1219 (1997) (defining the “Black/White binary paradigm” “as the
conception that race in America consists, either exclusively or primarily, of only two
constituent racial groups, the Black and the White”). Diversity concerns for dispute resolution
professionals, including mediators and arbitrators, extend to underrepresented groups based
on gender, disability, LGBTQ, and people of color status. See Benjamin G. Davis & Deborah
Masucci, Diversity Committee: Solving America’s ADR Diversity Issues, JUST RESOLUTIONS
E-NEWS (A.B.A., Chicago, Ill.), May 2015 (identifying these “four underrepresented groups”
as the target population for professional diversity enhancement efforts by the American Bar
Association’s Section of Dispute Resolution Diversity Committee). In focusing on the
example of Jay-Z’s petition, this Article continues to highlight black arbitrator diversity issues
consistent with my other work regarding racial prejudice in ADR based on being black. See,
e.g., Michael Z. Green, Reconsidering Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution for Black
Worker Matters, 70 SMU L. REV. 639, 643–61 (2017) (addressing and framing analytical
concepts of ADR in the workplace: negotiating while black, mediating while black, and
arbitrating while black).
4. See Darlene Ricker, Jay-Z’s ADR Problems: Mogul’s Case Spotlights Lack of Diverse
Arbitrators, A.B.A. J., May 2019, at 9, 9–10; Jonathan Stempel, Jay-Z Wins Fight for AfricanAmerican Arbitrators in Trademark Case, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2019, 5:22 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-people-jayz-lawsuit/jay-z-wins-fight-for-africanamerican-arbitrators-in-trademark-case-idUSKCN1PO32T [https://perma.cc/Z2M6-PY9Q].
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commercial intellectual property lawsuit between Jay-Z’s Rocawear fashion
company and Iconix Brand Group, Inc.,5 Jay-Z challenged the defendants’
request to resolve the dispute through arbitration pursuant to the procedures
of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). As the parties struggled to
agree on a final AAA arbitrator, Jay-Z decided to pose a legal challenge to
the lack of black arbitrators on the AAA roster.6
Jay-Z argued that, because he could not identify a single black arbitrator
among the list of two hundred arbitrators made available to him, he could not
resolve this dispute fairly in arbitration.7 Before filing, Jay-Z asked AAA to
provide a list of arbitrators of color.8 According to the court filling, AAA
responded to Jay-Z’s request by providing him a list of six arbitrators; only
three were black and, of these, one was a partner at the firm representing his
opponent.9 When Jay-Z questioned the list, AAA offered a final list of
twelve arbitrators that included the remaining two black arbitrators and
informed the parties that if they could not agree on a final arbitrator by a
certain deadline, AAA would select the arbitrator for their dispute.10
Jay-Z requested an injunction to stop the arbitration based on potential
equal protection violations of the New York State Constitution, alleging that
AAA had engaged in racial discrimination against litigants by failing to
provide diverse and representative arbitrators.11 Jay-Z filed similar charges
under New York State’s human rights and civil rights laws and New York
City’s Human Rights Law.12 The petition argued these laws applied to AAA
as a place of public accommodation that had failed to provide equal access
to litigants of color.13 The petition requested ninety days to find suitable
arbitrators or a permanent stay of the arbitration as against public policy.14
Jay-Z also alleged that AAA violated the New York deceptive trade practices
law by advertising on its website that it had a commitment to providing
arbitrators of diverse backgrounds.15 According to Jay-Z’s petition, this
advertising “misl[ed] prospective litigants into believing that . . . [AAA’s
roster contained] a critical mass of diverse arbitrators,” while offering “only
three African-American arbitrators to preside over his arbitration.”16

5. See Lauren Berg, Jay-Z Slams Arbitration Group’s Lack of Diversity in IP Row,
LAW360 (Nov. 28, 2018, 9:31 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1105807/jay-z-slamsarbitration-group-s-lack-of-diversity-in-ip-row [https://perma.cc/KGT5-V8GW].
6. See Caroline Simson, Jay-Z Adds Star Power to Diversity Concerns in Arbitration,
LAW360 (Dec. 14, 2018, 9:40 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1111523/jay-z-addsstar-power-to-diversity-concerns-in-arbitration [https://perma.cc/E7CA-LUE8].
7. Petition, supra note 2, at 7.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 7–8.
11. Id. at 9 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11).
12. Id. at 9–10.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 12.
15. Id. at 9–10.
16. Id. at 10.
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A judge initially granted the motion for a temporary restraining order to
allow Jay-Z to work with AAA on the diversity issue.17 After the court order,
AAA: (1) listed “eighteen individuals on . . . AAA’s national Large
Complex Case Roster [who] have self-identified as African-American”; (2)
expressed “a willingness” to pursue other means of improving diverse
representation in the arbitrator selection process, including the use of a threearbitrator panel; (3) agreed to work with Jay-Z to improve the slate of diverse
arbitrators on that panel by considering candidates proposed by Jay-Z; and
(4) developed other means to improve the diversity of the panel.18 AAA also
provided a comprehensive profile of information (including a list of all of its
arbitrators who had self-identified by race), demonstrating AAA’s efforts to
diversify not only the panel in question in the Jay-Z matter but all panels and
disputes for which AAA provides arbitrators.19 After reviewing the
additional information, Jay-Z agreed with AAA about its commitment to
diversify its roster and withdrew his request to halt the arbitration.20
Eventually, the parties settled the entire lawsuit.21
Jay-Z’s attempt to highlight arbitrator diversity was particularly exciting
because it allowed everyday individuals without the financial resources to
raise such a profound legal argument to have their day in court—and in the
court of public opinion. Arguably, a lack of arbitrator diversity poses the
greatest concern when individual minority participants, such as employees,
face well-heeled and powerful corporate opponents, such as employers.22
17. See Eriq Gardner, Jay-Z Wins Bid to Halt Arbitration for Racial Bias, HOLLYWOOD
REP. (Nov. 28, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/jay-z-wins-bidhalt-arbitration-racial-bias-1164590 [https://perma.cc/L8GW-TZX2].
18. See Letter to Justice Ostrager Withdrawing Motion Sequence 001, Thus Lifting the
Stay of Arbitration & Requesting a Status Conference in Ninety (90) Days at 3, Carter v.
Iconix Brand Grp., Inc., No. 655894/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 9, 2018) (alteration in original).
19. See Rekha Rangachari, Can’t Knock the Hustle . . . [To Broaden Diversity in
Arbitration], KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Jan. 15, 2019), http://arbitrationblog.
kluwerarbitration.com/2019/01/15/cant-knock-the-hustle-to-broaden-diversity-in-arbitration/
[https://perma.cc/X37Q-LQP9] (describing in detail AAA’s responses to Jay-Z’s lawsuit, with
links to AAA’s court filings). In the interest of full disclosure, the list includes this Article’s
author, as I am a member of the AAA labor panel. See Exhibit 3, Carter, No. 655894/2018.
Given that this was a business dispute involving intellectual property, I doubt that I would
have been selected or would have agreed to serve as the arbitrator in the Jay-Z dispute, but
this broad request from Jay-Z asking for “all arbitrators in the AAA National Roster”
demonstrated that he was looking beyond just his own dispute to determine the AAA’s
commitment to diversifying its arbitral ranks as a whole. Exhibit 3, supra, at 3.
20. See Judge Halts Arbitration in Jay-Z Suit Because of Racial Bias, FORBES (Nov. 29,
2018, 5:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalentertainment/2018/11/29/jay-zsuccessfully-halts-arbitration-due-to-racial-bias [https://perma.cc/WU9Z-UZYR]; see also
Emma Cueto, Jay-Z Claims Movement in Arbitrator Diversity Request, LAW360 (Dec. 10,
2018, 7:59 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1109815 [https://perma.cc/SN5C-KEH2].
21. See Kori Hale, Jay-Z’s Roc Nation Gets Iconix Lawsuit Dismissed for $15 Million,
FORBES (Nov. 24, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/korihale/2019/11/24/jay-zsroc-nation-gets-iconix-lawsuit-dismissed-for-15m [https://perma.cc/6KPX-NJNA].
22. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Lost Promise of Arbitration, 70 SMU L. REV. 849, 885
(2017). Twenty years ago, this Article’s author joined with others to raise awareness about
the lack of arbitrator diversity in situations where diverse claimants were asserting
employment discrimination. See Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer
Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J.
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For arbitration to be considered a successful form of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) in the future workplace, it must shift away from using
power imbalances (present in both individual forced or mandatory arbitration
and class arbitration waivers)23 and instead consistently use diverse
arbitrators to remove concerns about fairness and transparency.24 Fair
employment arbitration processes need a critical mass of diverse arbitrators
who more precisely reflect the makeup of the powerless parties attempting to
resolve their disputes with large businesses. However, the key challenge
presented in pursuing more diversity is recognizing that the parties,
especially businesses, choose the arbitrators and must agree to select diverse
arbitrators.
Unlike general concerns about improving workplace interactions by
promoting diversity, parties select arbitrators with the goal of prevailing in
the dispute at issue. For many participants, arbitration represents a fair
process with hopefully less costs and a shorter time for resolution when
compared to the courts. However, the arbitrator must decide who wins and
who loses the dispute. If parties (especially businesses) have their advocates
push for a specific arbitrator as a means to promote diversity, then those
parties and their advocates will face backlash from corporate investors and
higher-level executives for financial and reputational losses incurred if the
arbitrator rules against them. This concern suggests that the only resolution
to the arbitrator diversity problem is to select arbitrators randomly from a
pool that includes a critical mass of diverse arbitrators. The thesis offered
here to address arbitrator diversity would require all key stakeholders to agree
to a neutral service provider choosing the arbitrator on a random basis after
factoring in diversity. Parties would not pick the assigned arbitrator.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the significance of
continuing efforts aimed at achieving diversity in the arbitral ranks and how
that diversity has become imperative for disputes where employers insist that
employees arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims.25 Part II
399, 441–42, 441 n.153 (2000) (criticizing the lack of arbitrators of color and citing various
sources raising concerns about arbitrator diversity). Even at that time, others were already
criticizing the lack of arbitrator diversity in addressing statutory employment discrimination
claims. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights “Waived” and
Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 407–08 (1996) (criticizing the
diversity of arbitrators).
23. See infra Part I.A.
24. See Larry J. Pittman, Mandatory Arbitration: Due Process and Other Constitutional
Concerns, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 853, 860 (2011) (discussing the need for diversity in arbitrator
pools as “especially important when corporations and other businesses force their consumers
and employees to accept adhesion arbitration agreements, which raises serious questions about
the voluntariness of the weaker party’s acceptance of the negative implications from nondiverse pools of arbitrators who might be biased against them”).
25. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) prohibits
workplace discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and other protected class characteristics.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018). Title VII, as amended, creates major incentives for
competent attorneys to help employees bring private lawsuits as part of the enforcement
regime. See David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 990, 1022–23
(2017). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the federal agency
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identifies some of the missteps that occur when constitutents seek to increase
diversity in arbitrator pools without addressing or removing the risk and bias
limitations posed by parties ultimately having the power to make the final
selection of the arbitrator. Part II also offers a hypothetical that involves a
fictional arbitrator selection process to help illustrate the risk aversion and
implicit bias dynamics that can arise, especially depending on the experience
of the parties or their representatives. Part III proposes a new model for
arbitrator selection that emphasizes the importance of having a neutral
service provider, rather than the parties, select the arbitrator. Part III also
argues that all the key constituents should agree to such a process, modeled
after federal court judicial selection, as a way to provide a measurable
improvement to the arbitrator diversity problem in workplace disputes. This
Article concludes that any concerns regarding racial bias and access to justice
stemming from the dearth of black arbitrators can be overcome by letting
service providers mimic major digital platforms26 to match a critical mass of
diverse arbitrators with parties seeking to resolve workplace discrimination
disputes.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ARBITRATOR DIVERSITY IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES
A. Employment Discrimination Arbitration: A Forced and Unfair Forum?
Through forced or mandatory arbitration clauses in standard form
contracts, employers frustrate employees’ access to the courts by requiring
employees to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims as a
condition of employment.27 One of the biggest opportunities and challenges
when thinking about arbitrator diversity is its impact on the so-called
mandatory arbitration required by powerful businesses, which has the
potential to limit recovery, process, and transparency for the powerless in our
society—those who Jean Sternlight has called the “little guys.”28 When the
U.S. Supreme Court first endorsed this use of arbitration to resolve statutory
employment discrimination claims in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane

charged with enforcement of Title VII. See Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/
R7DX-239K] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020); see also Noll, supra, at 1014–15 (describing EEOC
enforcement authority).
26. See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 185
(2017) (discussing “labor-matching [platform] sites like Mechanical Turk and TaskRabbit and
transportation-matching [platform] sites like Uber and Lyft”).
27. See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards Justice in
Employment Law: Where To, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 156–57, 156 n.7
(2019) (explaining “mandatory arbitration”).
28. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 637 (1996) (criticizing mandatory
arbitration as a matter of statutory interpretation and as an undesirable public policy that
allows big corporate interests to harm the interests of the “little guys,” including employees,
consumers, and franchisees).
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Corp.29 and initiated the barrage of employer-required arbitration that has
taken over the employment dispute resolution process, arbitration was
considered just another forum.30 Recent studies suggest that employerrequired agreements to arbitrate have led to a situation where this mandatory
form of arbitration is outdistancing the court system as the most used process
to adjudicate worker disputes.31 A 2017 empirical study found that 56.2
percent of nonunion private sector employees (approximately 60.1 million
people) are now covered by employer-required arbitration agreements.32 In
a recent publication comprehensively analyzing that same study, Alex Colvin
concluded that “[i]t is the employers with the lowest paid workforces that are
most likely to impose mandatory arbitration on their employees.”33 As a
result, the overall fairness of the arbitral forum for low-paid workers registers
as a key concern in 2020.
Critics also assert that mandatory arbitration relegates employee claims to
a private forum where the decision maker is unlikely to look like the
employees and may not appreciate all the unique dynamics of the
environment that led them to file their discrimination claims.34 Employees
who seek justice in light of an employer’s racial or other discriminatory
practices will soon discover the likelihod that the arbitrator, who will decide
the matter, will be old, white, and male, which adds further concerns about
the fairness of mandatory arbitration.35 The reality is that the arbitrators
selected for these cases may tend to look more like the managers or
supervisors that the claimants have accused of statutory employment
discrimination.36 Jean Sternlight has asserted that, as the entity with the
29. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
30. Id. at 26, 31 (“In these cases we recognized that ‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))).
31. Alexander J. S. Colvin, The Metastasization of Mandatory Arbitration, 94 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 3, 24 (2019).
32. Id. at 10; see also Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C.
L. REV. 679, 689 (2018).
33. See Colvin, supra note 31, at 16. Unfortunately, improving arbitrator diversity alone
will not address the overall comprehensive concerns of low-wage workers subjected to
mandatory arbitration. See Green, supra note 3, at 671–74 (suggesting that mandatory
arbitration would work better for black workers at all levels if: (1) the roster of neutrals were
diverse; (2) unions represented the interests of the workers; (3) employees were provided with
legal counsel when the union could not pursue the matter to arbitration; and (4) employees
were always allowed to pursue the matter in court rather than in arbitration when important
court precedent needed to be set).
34. See Nicole Buonocore, Resurrecting a Dead Horse—Arbitrator Certification as a
Means to Achieve Diversity, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 483, 494 (1999) (describing how “the
true beneficiaries of the arbitration process, the employees, may begin to question whether a
system dominated by white male arbitrators is fair”).
35. See Victoria Pynchon, Diversity Is Not a Toxic Topic, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG., Apr. 2012, at 83, 86–87 (discussing that many ADR users and executives say the
market wants an old, white male and probably a retired judge).
36. Terry O’Neill, Success for #MeToo Means Reopening Courthouse Doors, LAW360
(Feb. 20, 2018, 11:24 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1011972/success-for-metoomeans-reopening-courthouse-doors [https://perma.cc/ZL3S-W5Q7] (noting that JAMS
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bargaining power insists on privatizing the dispute, the law aimed at
protecting individual employees subjected to this arbitral regime fails to
evolve.37
Mandatory arbitration also poses concerns about access to justice, as the
most vulnerable individuals in the workplace cannot pursue their statutory
employment discrimination claims in court and may be deterred from
obtaining access to workplace justice by the enforcement of both employerrequired arbitration and employer bans on class arbitration.38 With the deck
stacked against employees in so many ways, especially those who want to
join their legal interests in a class action, influential corporate entities—the
parties being regulated by the law (including employers)—can use their
tremendous bargaining power to make individual employees adhere to what
some commentators refer to as a flawed system of arbitration.39
reported that only 22 percent of its panelists were female and only 9 percent were people of
color).
37. Sternlight, supra note 27, at 157; see also Estlund, supra note 32, at 679 (referring to
how mandatory arbitration “threatens to stunt both the development of the law and public
knowledge of how the law is interpreted and applied in important arenas of public policy”); J.
Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052,
3056 (2015) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s enforcement of arbitration agreements has
started to “impede public awareness of the substantive law, inasmuch as private proceedings
frustrate the public’s ability to understand the state of the law, how particular laws are
interpreted, and how claims are pursued”).
38. See The Facts on Forced Arbitration: How Forced Arbitration Harms America’s
Workers, EMP. RTS. ADVOC. INST. FOR L. & POL’Y 1, http://employeerightsadvocacy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/Inst_ForcedArb_FactSheet_LittleGuy_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3MWZ-GN96] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020); see also Ellen E. Deason et al., ADR and Access
to Justice: Current Perspectives, 33 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 303, 322–23 (2018)
(providing my comments and a related discussion of how employees bringing claims based
on race can face access to justice concerns when arbitration is required, given that the typical
arbitrator is an older white male); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 710–11 (2012) (discussing how
courts have endorsed mandatory arbitration and refused to allow class arbitration, preventing
individual claims from going forward as a whole); Nancy A. Welsh, Do You Believe in
Magic?: Self-Determination and Procedural Justice Meet Inequality in Court-Connected
Mediation, 70 SMU L. REV. 721, 733–36 (2017) (laying out the components of procedural
justice that lead people to “perceive a process as fair or just”). But see Andrea Cann
Chandrasekher & David Horton, Arbitration Nation: Data from Four Providers, 107 CALIF.
L. REV. 1, 9 (2019) (finding that “arbitration has the capacity to facilitate access to justice”
because “[c]ases move quickly through the system, and corporations pick up most of the tab”);
Cole, supra note 22, at 866 (suggesting that “the arbitral process provides the kind of access
to justice, together with a fair process, that might well serve both minority disputants and oneshot players alike”); Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness?: The Case Against
the Fairness Arbitration Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 277–78 (2008) (asserting
that “arbitration has in important respects improved access to justice for the average
individual” because it has “lowered the cost of dispute resolution, it has delivered superior, or
at least comparable, outcomes for individuals, and it has done so at a far faster pace than our
sluggish system of civil litigation”).
39. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking
the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/
business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html
[https://
perma.cc/2UX3-AMZL] (describing a study of several cases showing that once parties were
blocked from going to court as a class, “most people dropped their claims entirely” and
discussing quotes from Judge Berle Schiller describing how employees have no bargaining
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Further, when important issues of law are resolved in private arbitration,
which does not require a public acknowledgement of wrongdoing, the root
causes of these issues may still persist.40 This can prevent similarly situated
employees from uncovering broad discriminatory practices.41 As a result,
employers may be able to privatize the public system of justice provided by
an employment discrimination statute for their own personal benefits.42 An
employer can then use the pressure for repeat business within this private
arbitration scheme to select known arbitrators who they hope to induce to
rule in their favor.43 As a result, calls for increased diversity in the arbitral
ranks have a unique importance to black and other vulnerable employees
seeking vindication in arbitration for a workplace discrimination claim.
B. Arbitrator Diversity Should Match Employee Claimant Diversity
AAA Chair of the Council James Jenkins reflected on the need for future
efforts to pursue arbitrator diversity in employment discrimination disputes,
opining that, “[w]ith more parties choosing to resolve their disputes through
arbitration and mediation, ADR service providers need to ensure that such
parties are given the option to select from panels of arbitrators and mediators
who they believe come from backgrounds and experiences similar to their

power and must face “a distasteful dilemma” of being forced to either “give up certain rights
[via arbitration] or give up the job”).
40. See Sternlight, supra note 27, at 181, 188–92, 202–04 (describing concerns about the
lack of public access to precedential arbitration decisions; the limits on arbitrators that make
them unlikely to issue progressive decisions that advance the law; and companies’ use of
private arbitration as a tool to hide predatory managers’ misdeeds and silence victimized
employees by suppressing public knowledge about the existence of discriminatory actions);
see also Richard Delgado, The Unbearable Lightness of Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Critical Thoughts on Fairness and Formality, 70 SMU L. REV. 611, 630–33 (2017) (arguing
that corporations tend to act in their own best interests by maximizing profits and that
expecting a company to behave better in arbitration regarding wrongdoing committed against
a weaker party is a “fruitless enterprise” because corporations are only willing to pursue
systemic changes when their public images are harmed); Imre S. Szalai, A New Legal
Framework for Employee and Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 19 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 653, 655 (2018) (noting that private arbitration can conceal corporate wrongdoing and
harm vulnerable employees).
41. See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 39 (discussing then EEOC Chair Jenny
Yang’s comments, which noted that resolution of statutory employment discrimination claims
in arbitration “keeps any discussion of discriminatory practices hidden from other workers
‘who might be experiencing the same thing,’” while also reviewing how major court cases
brought by black employees against Nike in 2003 and Walgreens in 2005 led to key changes
in those companies’ policies).
42. See Glover, supra note 37, at 3075–78 (asserting concerns about using arbitration as
a mechanism to contract around or “negate substantive law”).
43. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a “Privatization of
the Justice System,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/
business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html
[https://perma.cc/5FXS-9DFQ] (describing several cases in which employees proceeded to
arbitration after being denied the chance to bring their claims in court, noting concerns about
arbitrators with repeat business handling cases involving the same employer after they had
returned favorable rulings for that employer in the past, and mentioning an arbitrator who
ruled against an employer in an age discrimination suit and was never used again).
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own.”44 AAA, JAMS,45 and other neutral service provider groups like them
have the competing objectives of selecting arbitrators on a fair basis and also
“satisfy[ing] the parties.”46 Providing a diverse pool is not just a nice goal;
the arbitration system is intended to provide a fair forum for black workers
to vindicate racial discrimination claims pursuant to a statutory scheme.47
Failing to diversify the pool of arbitrators sends a “detrimental and hostile”
message to all black workers that based on history the process “is comparable
to what all-white juries have done.”48 Ultimately, if arbitration serves to
replicate the legal system by becoming a substitute for the judicial forum (as
it has developed under mandatory arbitration), then there must be a slate of
arbitrators available who “reflect diverse life experiences which include
exposure to the problems posed by the cases, particularly those involving
discrimination.”49
1. Service Provider Efforts to Improve the Lack of Arbitrator Diversity
Increasing calls for arbitrator diversity in light of Jay-Z’s lawsuit were not
lost on the three key neutral service providers handling employment
discrimination disputes in the United States: AAA, JAMS, and the
International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution (CPR).50 AAA
and JAMS are the largest dispute resolution service providers in the

44. See James Jenkins, Arbitrators and Mediators Should Reflect Society’s Diversity,
LAW360 (Jan. 16, 2019, 10:51 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1115452/arbitratorsand-mediators-should-reflect-society-s-diversity [https://perma.cc/C8LM-U7TW]. Others
have also focused on the failure of arbitrator diversity to harmonize with the diversity of the
participants. See, e.g., Sasha A. Carbone & Jeffrey T. Zaino, Increasing Diversity Among
Arbitrators: A Guideline to What the New Arbitrator Should Be Doing to Achieve This Goal,
N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., Jan. 2012, at 33, 33–34 (quoting the criticism of Gwynne Wilcox, who
stated that “[t]he majority of arbitrators do not reflect the workers who appear before them
and cannot identify with their realities as workers”); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Impact of
the Growth and Use of ADR Processes on Minority Communities, Individual Rights, and
Neutrals, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 789, 801 (2011) (“The lack of diversity in the pool of potential
neutrals raises suspicion among minorities who must use the ADR process to resolve their
dispute.”).
45. JAMS is a private dispute resolution group; previously, the acronym stood for Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. but, at present, the organization uses only the
abbreviated title. The JAMS Name, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/about-the-jams-name/
[https://perma.cc/GM9V-TTQJ] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
46. William B. Gould IV, Kissing Cousins?: The Federal Arbitration Act and Modern
Labor Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609, 656 (2006).
47. Pittman, supra note 24, at 864–65, 868, 876–77 (discussing unconscious racial bias
exhibited by nondiverse arbitrators and the requirement that arbitration be a neutral forum for
an employee to pursue the same substantive rights and theories of statutory liability as is
provided by the courts).
48. Green, supra note 3, at 661 (quoting Gould, supra note 46, at 658).
49. Gould, supra note 46, at 688.
50. See Paige Smith, Lack of Arbitrator Diversity Is an Issue of Supply and Demand,
BLOOMBERG L. (May 15, 2019, 6:04 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/lack-of-arbitrator-diversity-is-an-issue-of-supply-and-demand
[https://perma.cc/
P9VF-6QBM] (referring to “three primary arbitral entities that resolve employment
disputes”).
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country.51 Representatives from AAA, JAMS, and CPR responded to
questions about diversity within a week of Jay-Z withdrawing his petition;
all reported that they had been engaged in efforts to improve diversity among
their panelists “for years” before the Jay-Z matter.52
For example, AAA highlighted its Higginbotham Fellows Program, started
in 2009, which provides mentoring and training to diverse dispute resolution
professionals, as well as its separate efforts to include diverse speakers in its
programs and to build partnerships with national and minority bar
associations to find diverse arbitrators.53 JAMS emphasized that it provides
a sample diversity and inclusion arbitration clause that parties may
incorporate, which states that, “wherever practicable,” the parties will
appoint diverse arbitrators.54 CPR noted that it created a diversity task force
in 2006 and that it includes a “diversity statement” when providing a panel
of arbitrators for consideration that asks the parties to select more diverse
individual panelists.55
Additional information supports the diversity efforts of these three
providers. JAMS recently hired its first diversity program manager, Joanne
Saint Louis, to lead its diversity and inclusion efforts.56 CPR developed a
diversity commitment plan in 2013, which encourages corporations and their
counsel to pledge their commitment to diversity in the selection of mediators
and arbitrators.57 In its 2018 annual report,58 AAA reported that the
proportion of cases in which a woman or minority arbitrator was appointed
had reached 27 percent.59 The report described the “diversity of the
arbitrators who decide the cases” as “[v]ery important to the legitimacy of
the process” and opined that “[w]omen and minorities need to be among the
arbitrators who actually serve on cases as well as be represented in the pools
of expert arbitrators an organization can offer the parties.”60
Regarding demographics for all three providers, some diversity numbers
were identified in a story in May 2019.61 CPR’s roster of panelists includes
51. Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 43 (characterizing “[t]he American
Arbitration Association and JAMS . . . [as] the country’s two largest arbitration firms”).
52. Simson, supra note 6.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Aebra Coe, ADR Giant Taps Diversity Pro After Jay-Z Beef with Industry,
LAW360 (Oct. 11, 2019, 5:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1208708/adr-giant-tapsdiversity-pro-after-jay-z-beef-with-industry [https://perma.cc/6483-XHPR].
57. See Maria R. Volpe, Measuring Diversity in the ADR Field: Some Observations and
Challenges Regarding Transparency, Metrics and Empirical Research, 19 PEPP. DISP. RESOL.
L.J. 201, 201 (2019) (describing this pledge); see also David H. Burt & Laura A. Kaster, Why
Bringing Diversity to ADR Is a Necessity, ACC DOCKET, Oct. 2013, at 41, 41 (describing this
pledge).
58. See generally AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT & FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS (2019), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA_
2018_Annual_Report_and_Financial_Statements.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B8U-4PBB].
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id.
61. Smith, supra note 50.
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17 percent women and 13 percent individuals who self-identify as ethnically
or racially diverse, with 31 percent of those panelists selected for arbitration
being racially diverse; JAMS’s roster is 28 percent women; and AAA’s roster
is 25 percent women and persons of color.62 The impact that this lack of
diversity in key service provider pools may have on diverse claimants,
despite longstanding efforts to improve, has become a major issue.
Mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination claims involves
vulnerable workers of color and other protected classes; thus, a nondiverse
arbitrator pool raises questions about the integrity of the entire dispute
resolution process. Additionally, this problem is not limited to domestic
arbitration; many commentators have also expressed concerns about
arbitrator diversity in the international sphere.63 In fact, international
arbitrator diversity concerns have been much more rigorously reviewed than
the critiques of domestic arbitration in the United States.64
In seeking arbitrators, JAMS narrows the supply side of the pool of
potential arbitrators by preferring a nondiverse group: those who rise to the
level of partner at a law firm or former or retired judge.65 This approach is
understandable on one level because JAMS wants “judges or lawyers who
have excellent reputations in their [fields].”66 However, if only “2 percent of
law firm partners are black, 4 percent are Asian, and 2 percent are Hispanic,”
finding diverse arbitrators that meet these professional criteria poses an
obstacle.67 As Sarah Cole points out, it is difficult to find diverse candidates
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck et al., The Diversity Challenge: Exploring the “Invisible
College” of International Arbitration, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 429, 467–94 (2015)
(describing diversity issues in international arbitration); Douglas Pilawa, Note, Sifting
Through the Arbitrators for the Woman, the Minority, the Newcomer, 51 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 395, 412–29 (2019) (describing critiques of the lack of arbitral diversity in the international
arbitration community); Gary L. Benton, Let’s Stop Talking About the Arbitrator Diversity
Problem, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Jan. 14, 2018), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/
2018/01/14/post/ [https://perma.cc/5DXL-PFNP] (discussing diversity issues in international
arbitration); see also Won Kidane, Does Cultural Diversity Improve or Hinder the Quality of
Arbitral Justice?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 31, 2017), http://arbitrationblog.
kluwerarbitration.com/2017/03/31/does-cultural-diversity-improve-or-hinder-the-quality-ofarbitral-justice [https://perma.cc/WY2Z-N6VG] (describing how matching Chinese or
African witnesses with arbitrators of the same cultural background could help to improve the
quality of the arbitration process); Catherine A. Rogers, The Key to Unlocking the Arbitrator
Diversity Paradox?: Arbitrator Intelligence, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Dec. 27, 2017), http://
arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/12/27/on-arbitrators
[https://perma.cc/45CGSZ58] (describing concerns about diversity in arbitration).
64. Compare Chiara Georgetti, Is the Truth in the Eyes of the Beholder?: The Perils and
Benefits of Empirical Research in International Investment Arbitration, 12 SANTA CLARA J.
INT’L L. 263, 269 (2013) (discussing how the trend of international investment arbitrators
being primarily “‘pale, male, and stale’ . . . can be proven empirically”), with Burt & Kaster,
supra note 57, at 41–42 (finding that a “dramatic absence of diversity in the neutrals selected
for [domestic] alternative dispute resolution (ADR) proceedings has flown under the radar”
and noting that “participation of racial minorities is not statistically available but is known to
be far lower”).
65. Smith, supra note 50.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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who were law firm partners or judges.68 Statistics from the American Bar
Association (ABA) show that, as of 2019, 36 percent of active attorneys are
women—a 5.2 percent increase from 2009.69 By far, the most represented
racial group over that ten-year period has been Caucasian/white, with 85
percent of active attorneys identifying as such in 2019.70 Hispanic and
African American attorneys were the second-most represented racial group,
but each racial group alone only comprised 5 percent of total active
attorneys.71 Since 2009, African American attorneys saw only a 0.3 percent
increase in representation.72
Diversity demographics for lawyers who are partners show even worse
results. According to the National Association for Law Placement (NALP),
“only 18.7 percent of equity partners in law firms are women.”73 NALP data
also indicates that racial minorities as a whole “account for only 6.1 percent
of law firm equity partners.”74 The Federal Judicial Center published three
charts depicting the racial composition of new Article III judges from 1940
to 2017.75. One chart demonstrates an insignificant increase in African
American appointments from 2015 onward and a consistently white
majority.76 A second chart shows that all thirteen of the new judges
appointed in 2017 were white.77 The final chart shows that, in 2017, 146
judges in 2017 identified as African American, while 1070 judges identified
as white.78
2. Implicit Bias Recognition and Training as an Option to Improve
Arbitration for Diverse Parties
Given both the lack of judicial diversity and the resemblance between
arbitration of statutory legal matters and bench trials, efforts to address
concerns about diversity of judges in bench trials could be helpful in
addressing similar concerns about diversity of arbitrators.79 Melissa Breger
68. Id.
69. See 2019 ABA National Lawyer Population Survey, A.B.A. 1, https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/national-lawyerpopulation-demographics-2009-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/WR3V-8ZJ5] (last visited Apr.
12, 2020).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Jenkins, supra note 44.
74. Id.
75. See Demography of Article III Judges, 1789–2017, FED. JUD. CTR., https://
www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/race-and-ethnicity [https://perma.cc/YYJ9UMWW] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See generally Melissa L. Breger, Making the Invisible Visible: Exploring Implicit
Bias, Judicial Diversity, and the Bench Trial, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1039 (2019). For further
discussion, see Kevin R. Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A Principled Approach to the
Quest for Racial Diversity on the Judiciary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5 (2004) (raising general
concerns about the lack of racial diversity within the judiciary).
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recently made the case that implicit bias might have severe consequences in
bench trials, where the judge is the sole fact finder.80 Even well-intentioned
judges, when acting as the sole decision maker,81 may contribute to disparate
treatment of individual minority participants by being unable to appreciate
the systematic disparate treatment that the minority participant may have
experienced at various stages of a dispute.82
Similar to concerns about public confidence and trust in the arbitration
process, concerns about transparency in the judicial process have become a
prominent rallying cry in the efforts to improve judicial diversity.83 The
quest to increase diversity in the judiciary does not suggest that racial identity
represents a proxy for how a judge may decide a case or that it would warrant
matching judges with participants based on race.84 However, one’s life
experiences can shape how one judges. If the public is to trust the fairness
of the legal system, courts should seek to provide sufficient diversity in the
judiciary so that monolithic experiences would be outliers and not the
norm.85
A recent article has suggested a method for dealing with the lack of
diversity and implicit bias with respect to jurors by creating a new process
for selection.86 This new process would prime jurors to think about their
implicit biases before trial and give them the opportunity to process the
information they receive.87 A judge’s instruction or court video could raise
juror awareness of implicit bias during the voir dire or selection process.88
The judge would have the opportunity to encourage the jurors to be aware of
their implicit biases, provide a jury instruction to remind jurors about implicit
bias concerns during deliberation, and, at the very least, emphasize to the
jurors the need to be informed about implicit bias during jury selection or
voir dire.89 Such training may also be helpful for the arbitrators available for

80. Breger, supra note 79, at 1053.
81. One way to address this concern of implicit bias, at least in mediation, is to involve
multiple mediators, including some mediators of color. See Carol Izumi, Implicit Bias and
Prejudice in Mediation, 70 SMU L. REV. 681, 687 (2017).
82. Breger, supra note 79, at 1057.
83. Id. at 1073.
84. Id. at 1077. Notably, requirements that jurors be selected from a cross section of the
community and that no juror be barred from service due to race alone exist to further
inclusiveness and guarantee due process; they are not based on an assumption that jurors or
judges base decisions on race. See Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 79, at 23. However,
racism in jury selection can still occur through peremptory challenges, in which a party may
remove a juror without offering a reason, or by allowing jurors to be removed for cause when
their views warrant some fear of impartiality. Id.
85. Breger, supra note 79, at 1078–79; see also Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note
79, at 10 (discussing the value of judicial diversity for understanding the distinct “voice of
color” that some minorities use to show that they may view the world in a different way).
86. See generally Anona Su, A Proposal to Properly Address Implicit Bias in the Jury, 31
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 79 (2020).
87. Id. at 98.
88. Id. at 98–99.
89. Id. Arbitrators in employment disputes might also be better off if trained on
understanding implicit bias. See Nicholas Enrique O’Connor, Note, The “Insurmountable
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selection in employment discrimination cases; neutral service providers
could mark those arbitrators as having been trained to understand, and be
thoughtful of, implicit biases.
3. Future Steps to Increase the Diversity Pool
Because of the concerns about having a diverse pool of arbitrators, the
service providers will have to address the supply-side issue by removing
some of the group restrictions that they have imposed on their candidate pool.
For example, parties may need to recognize that successful arbitrators,
especially those familiar with workplace disputes, need not be former
partners of law firms or retired judges. Instead of focusing on a candidate’s
former status-based position, it might be helpful for neutral service providers
to put a premium on mastery of the subject matter at hand, especially for
employment disputes.
Also, a neutral service provider could prioritize finding an arbitrator who
has spent a dozen years representing employees or defending employers in
employment disputes. If actual field experience in either bringing or
defending workplace discrimination claims were the focus, diverse
arbitrators would be easier to obtain. This focus would also increase the
likelihood that various human resources and labor relations managers, as well
as union representatives and civil rights advocates, would be selected for
labor matters or become part of the pool of diverse arbitrators eligible for
selection in workplace discrimination disputes.90
Even nondiverse arbitrators may benefit from training in considering
implicit biases when deciding claims of workplace discrimination. Whether
Textual Obstacle”: A Narrow Interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 855, 879 (2019).
90. See Jay E. Grenig & Rocco M. Scanza, The Case for the Non-lawyer Employment
Arbitrator, DISP. RESOL. J., May–July 2009, at 8, 9 (highlighting how the pool of diverse
arbitrators would be increased if “minorities from business, government, unions, and
academia” who are not lawyers were included); see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Living the
Dream of ADR: Reflections on Four Decades of the Quiet Revolution in Dispute Resolution,
18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 513, 530 (2017) (describing the need for diversity among
arbitrators and asserting the value of nonlawyers with expertise in the type of dispute as a
source for increased diversity). Unfortunately, many of these individuals cannot serve as
arbitrators in an employment discrimination dispute unless they are lawyers. See, e.g.,
Qualification Criteria and Responsibilities for Members of the AAA Panel of Employment
Arbitrators, AM. ARB. ASS’N 1, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/
Employment%20Arbitrators%20Qualification%20Criteria.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B9QGLVHM] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) [hereinafter AAA Employment Arbitrator Qualification
Criteria] (requiring that panelists be attorneys with at least ten years of experience in
employment law); see also Employment & Labor: JAMS Employment Mediation, Arbitration
and ADR Services, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/employment [https://perma.cc/LB2RCXMP] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (describing how the arbitrators are “retired federal, state
trial, and appellate judges and former litigators”). The AAA Labor Panel does not require that
the panelists be attorneys but rather only that they have ten years’ experience in labor relations
and a “judicial temperament.” Qualification Criteria for Admittance to the AAA Labor Panel,
AM. ARB. ASS’N
1,
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/
Labor_QualificationsCriteria_AAAPanel.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYU5-B6AN] (last visited
Apr. 12, 2020).
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it involves in-depth training or merely viewing juror instructions developed
on the subject, some level of acknowledgement of the issue may be a
worthwhile endeavor for neutral service providers. This will also help
neutral service providers as they deal with supply-side issues, either in
diversifying the pool or helping the nondiverse members of the pool become
more aware of unconscious and hidden biases.
II. DISCONNECTS IN ARBITRATOR DIVERSITY: PARTY GATEKEEPER
SELECTIONS
A. Risk Aversion: Winning with the Familiar and Not the Diverse
Despite repeated mourning and lamentation from various interested
sectors about the dearth of diverse arbitrators who resolve disputes with
companies, those seeking to address this complaint have still failed to make
any significant changes.91 Part of this challenge arises from the difficulty of
acquiring data to demonstrate the full scope of the problem.92 Maria Volpe
has catalogued the lack of metrics capturing the diversity of arbitrators.93
Further, Ben Davis and Deborah Masucci have also identified the need for
more diversity data from courts and ADR neutral service providers on the
use of dispute resolution neutrals.94 All of this data retrieval seems aimed at
the positive end of discovering just how bad the lack of arbitral diversity is
and priming the pump to find and supply many more diverse individuals to
be eligible for arbitrator service.
While the diverse arbitrator supply concern is an issue, it pales in
comparison to the demand issue regarding diversity in selecting arbitrators.95

91. See Estlund, supra note 32, at 681, 687 (noting that since “firms have no legal
obligation to make their chosen procedures publicly available,” this “has made it impossible
to develop an accurate empirical assessment of the shape of mandatory arbitration as a
mechanism of dispute resolution and has greatly handicapped efforts to hold firms publicly
accountable for the fairness of their dispute resolution procedures” and that there is “little
representative data on any aspect of arbitration”); Volpe, supra note 57. See generally Samuel
Estreicher et al., Evaluating Employment Arbitration: A Call for Better Empirical Research,
70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 375 (2018) (criticizing the lack of empirical data that would help
understand more about employment arbitration generally). A more recent and comprehensive
study of so-called forced arbitration, compiled from “40,000 arbitrations” filed between
January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2016, with four service providers in California attempts
to shine some light on the situation. See Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 38, at 26–28.
92. Volpe, supra note 57, at 202–03 (“[A]ccessing data to gain clarity about the extent of
diversity has been and remains a daunting undertaking.”).
93. Id. at 206.
94. Davis & Masucci, supra note 3; see also Deborah Rothman, Gender Diversity in
Arbitrator Selection, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2012, at 22, 22 (referring to the need to rely
on anecdotal information about gender diversity because “no reliable data is accessible” on
women in commercial arbitration).
95. See Marvin E. Johnson & Homer C. La Rue, The Gated Community: Risk Aversion,
Race, and the Lack of Diversity in Mediation in the Top Ranks, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring
2009, at 17, 18. As these authors note, “minority neutrals with experience and skills have
often been ignored by those wanting to enhance the diversity of the field and have been
overlooked by sophisticated ADR users.” Id. at 17. However, as long as ADR users’ risk-
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Two prominent labor and employment dispute resolution neutrals, Marvin E.
Johnson and Homer C. La Rue, noted that, despite diversity efforts aimed at
providing additional training to enhance opportunities for entry-level neutrals
of color, sophisticated ADR users were still not selecting skilled minority
neutrals.96 To enhance the access of experienced neutrals of color to ADR
clients, Johnson and La Rue formed ACCESS ADR in 2003 with the support
of JAMS and the ABA’s Section of Dispute Resolution.97 Johnson and La
Rue viewed the lack of diversity among ADR professionals as a subset of a
broader concern regarding the need to diversify the legal profession given
that “30 percent of the general population of the United States is made up of
persons of color, but only 10 percent of the lawyers fall into that category.”98
In forming ACCESS ADR, Johnson and La Rue planned on building
opportunities for experienced mediators of color to meet corporate ADR
users, which would highlight the overall lack of diversity and foster unique
engagements between these groups.99
Despite the noble aims of ACCESS ADR, Johnson and La Rue eventually
found a severe disconnect between the ADR users and their representatives,
many of whom were lawyers and referred to as gatekeepers.100 Risk aversion
prevented these representatives from using highly skilled mediators of color,
even when these mediators had been identified and relationships had been
formed through ACCESS ADR.101 While a desire to continue to pursue
“well-known” mediators resulted in some of the failures to select the
mediators of color, there was also some evidence that racial and ethnic bias
played a role in the selection process.102 Johnson and La Rue noted that the
corporate ADR users resided in a metaphorical gated community to which
only the representatives had access; those users never encountered the
mediators of color because the users’ representatives stopped the mediators
at the gated entrance.103 Representatives refused to employ minority
mediators despite corporate ADR users’ statements about the need for
averse representatives continue to employ already “well-known” neutrals and engage in
“racial and ethnic bias,” access to experienced neutrals of color will be stifled. Id. at 20.
96. Id. at 17.
97. See Homer C. La Rue & Marvin E. Johnson, ACCESS ADR: A New Diversity
Initiative Launched with the Support of the JAMS Foundation and the ABA, CORP. COUNS.
BUS. J. (May 1, 2004), https://ccbjournal.com/articles/access-adr-new-diversity-initiativelaunched-support-jams-foundation-and-aba [https://perma.cc/6CCE-P879].
98. Id. A more recent report found that “minorities comprise 30% of the civilian
workforce but [only] 15% of” lawyers and that even fewer are mediators and arbitrators. See
Deborah Masucci, Moving Forward for the Benefit of our Members: Minorities in Dispute
Resolution, JUST RESOLUTIONS E-NEWS (A.B.A., Chicago, Ill.), May 2015.
99. Masucci, supra note 98.
100. See Johnson & La Rue, supra note 95; see also David A. Hoffman & Lamont E.
Stallworth, Leveling the Playing Field for Workplace Neutrals: A Proposal for Achieving
Racial and Ethnic Diversity, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr. 2008, at 37, 41 (referring to outside
attorneys that select arbitrators as “gatekeepers,” noting that they are disproportionately white,
and emphasizing that they “tend to appoint someone like themselves, someone white, a
lawyer, and usually male”).
101. Johnson & La Rue, supra note 95, at 18.
102. Id. at 19–20.
103. Id. at 19.
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diversity in the mediation pool and their familiarity with many of the
ACCESS ADR advisory board members who had invited the users to
participate in the project.104 Given that the ACCESS ADR program involved
the selection of mediators for “high-stakes and complex cases,”105 Johnson
and La Rue noted that representatives for the ADR users may have adopted
a rationale of risk aversion, espoused by one mediator as a justification for
nonselection: “when an attorney with a high-value case refers it to mediation,
he is ‘never going to be criticized for selecting a well-known mediator.’”106
In looking at the example from ACCESS ADR, the process of having party
representatives choose the arbitrator poses a key impediment to increasing
the diversity of arbitrators selected, even if the pool of arbitrators supplied
provides tremendous diversity. One might suggest a legal challenge to the
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate if the selection process will result in
a nondiverse result. The few cases where parties have challenged the lack of
diversity of arbitrators by suing the neutral service providers have proven to
be unsuccessful, with courts giving very little consideration to the merits
when issuing a dismissal.107 Also, some parties may not consider improving
diversity in the pool of arbitrators to be a vital or urgent concern about access
to justice but rather merely a nice consideration.108 Regardless of the
diversity of the pool of arbitrators or the actual panel made available, the
parties make the ultimate selection.109 No party will be happy with having
chosen a diverse arbitrator if the chosen arbitrator does not rule in favor of
104. Id. at 18.
105. Id. at 19.
106. Urška Velikonja, Making Peace and Making Money: Economic Analysis of the
Market for Mediators in Private Practice, 72 ALB. L. REV. 257, 275 (2009) (quoting Email
from John Bickerman, Mediator, to Urška Velikonja (Mar. 23, 2008)). Such risk aversion
could present a more complex catch-22 for a black attorney or an attorney of color asked to
represent her corporate clients’ business and diversity interests and also asked to promote the
diversity interests of her race. See Margaret M. Russell, Beyond “Sellouts” and “Race
Cards”: Black Attorneys and the Straitjacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 766, 768
(1997) (describing the “double bind that tokenization imposes on minority attorneys,” defined
as “the pressure to comport themselves generally as though the legal profession is integrated,
colorblind, and even raceless, [and] yet to take on the burdens—gratefully!—of role-modeling
and otherwise representing their race on the occasional race commission or diversity
committee instituted by their colleagues to manifest concern for the plight of minorities”).
107. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 47 n.116 (1999)
(describing how legal challenges to outside processes for choosing arbitrators that focus upon
“attacking the lack of demographic diversity” have failed); Weatherspoon, supra note 44, at
801 (noting that the few claims raising legal challenges to the “system of exclusion and
invisibility” for diverse neutrals have not received a favorable reception from the courts); see
also Green, supra note 3, at 659 n.108 (citing Smith v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 233 F.3d
502 (7th Cir. 2000) and Olson v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 876 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Tex.
1995) as examples of challenges to the diversity of arbitrator pools that have “fallen on deaf
ears” (quoting Michael Z. Green, An Essay Challenging the Racially Biased Selection of
Arbitrators for Employment Discrimination Claims, 4 J. AM. ARB. 1, 25 (2005))).
108. See Rogers, supra note 63 (discussing how there is a “disconnect” between “arbitral
institutions” being nudged to increase the diversity of their panels and being successful in
doing so and the “willingness of parties” to pursue appointment of more diverse arbitrators).
109. See Smith, supra note 50 (“[T]he final choice is made by the parties.”).
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that party.110 Winning is the name of the game in arbitration. When selecting
an arbitrator, the parties are concerned with who wins and who loses, not
with promoting diversity.
As Johnson and La Rue explained, parties have no incentive to choose a
diverse arbitrator over a familiar, tried-and-true choice in a high-stakes
arbitration.111 Because an arbitrator decides how a dispute will be resolved,
the stakes and risks in choosing an arbitrator can be even higher than in
choosing, for instance, a mediator, who merely facilitates the dispute’s
resolution pursuant to the parties’ agreement.112 Deviating from the familiar
can breed contempt if the result is a loss. Catherine Rogers has referred to
the conflict of pursuing both diversity and victory as a “diversity paradox.”113
The solution to this “paradox,” according to Rogers, is to “close the gap
between the altruism that animates abstract concerns about diversity, and the
strategic pragmatism that dominates arbitrator selection in individual
cases.”114 Unfortunately, to close this gap, parties must decide that the
diversity objective is just as important in arbitrator selection as prevailing in
the dispute.
Because the parties make the final choice about the arbitrator, concerns of
bias—both overt and unconscious—may also play a role in that selection. As
an example, imagine that a black female charges her employer with
discrimination, and the matter must go to arbitration for final resolution; if
there is virtually no chance that the pool of potential arbitrators called upon
will include a black woman, this suggests the deck has been stacked against
the claimant.115 This is not to say that a white male could not make a fair
resolution of the black female claimant’s charge in a particular instance.116

110. See Pilawa, supra note 63, at 417 & n.141 (describing the response of an anonymous
commentator to a survey on international arbitration as expressing that “the desirability of
promoting diversity is the last feature on anyone’s mind” (quoting Lucy Greenwood & C.
Mark Baker, Getting a Better Balance on International Arbitration Tribunals, 28 J. LONDON
CT. INT’L ARB. 653, 661 n.42 (2012))).
111. See generally Johnson & La Rue, supra note 95.
112. See Green, supra note 3, at 656 (“[M]ediators should be selected based upon their
ability to facilitate negotiation of the dispute at issue.”); id. at 666 (describing a typical
arbitration process of using AAA to provide a list of arbitrators who are “qualified to decide
employment discrimination cases”).
113. See Pilawa, supra note 63, at 418; Rogers, supra note 63.
114. Pilawa, supra note 63, at 418 (quoting Rogers, supra note 63).
115. See Caley E. Turner, “Old, White, and Male”: Increasing Gender Diversity in
Arbitration Panels 12 (Summer 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.cpradr.org/
news-publications/articles/2015-03-03--old-white-and-male-increasing-gender-diversity-inarbitration-panels/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/Old_White_and_Male_Increasing_
Gender_Diversity.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4EC-8CWP] (describing concerns about the
appearance of impropriety where “a young Latino woman [was] forced to arbitrate an
employment discrimination case against her boss, a white male, in front of a panel of three
white male arbitrators”).
116. See Pilawa, supra note 63, at 429 (“[I]t is not the arbitrator’s culture that matters. It
is more the arbitrator’s ability to understand the cultural significance of certain facts.”); see
also Pittman, supra note 24, at 860, 863–64 (finding that “[w]hen a disproportionate number
of all arbitrators are conservative, white men, it is only reasonable that minority and female
plaintiffs will be concerned about the fairness and quality of arbitration awards” and noting
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However, the claimant may perceive the systematic effort to erect barriers as
indicative of an unjust dispute resolution process. Any dispute system
infected with systematic bias deters the pursuit of justice.
B. Gatekeeper Effect: A Hypothetical
To illustrate the double bind placed on decision makers when they
represent clients in arbitration but are also asked to support a diversity
objective in selecting an arbitrator, this section offers the following
hypothetical.117 This hypothetical derives from my own experiences and
observations as an employment discrimination attorney, law professor,
scholar, and arbitrator. The hypothetical also relates to stories I have been
told when teaching or presenting the subject of diversity in the arbitrator
selection process for employment discrimination cases.
Sheila Payne, an African American female and electrical engineer, worked
for HighlyPositioned Company (“the Company”). Payne believed she had
been subjected to racial harassment and insults along with comments of a
sexual nature by her supervisor, Bob Defending. Defending is a fifty-yearold white man. Payne complained pursuant to the Company’s harassment
policy procedures. A brief investigation occurred, and the Company
reprimanded Defending and told him to cease making comments of a sexual
or racial nature. Payne continued to work for Defending, who continued to
subject her to racial and sexual comments. She then filed an Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge. The Company
responded with a position statement to the EEOC asserting as its defense that
Payne failed to utilize its harassment procedures. Payne filed a claim of
employment discrimination in court after obtaining a right-to-sue letter.118
Payne has struggled to find an attorney.
The Company’s outside counsel filed an appearance and a motion to
compel arbitration. Payne had signed some forms several years ago when
she was first employed that said she “agrees to arbitrate any and all disputes
with her employer subject to the rules of Highly, Hardy, and Hubris (‘Triple
H’) Arbitration Services.” Payne obtained a lawyer, who told her that she
must select a third-party neutral arbitrator to decide her case. Payne’s lawyer
went to the Triple H website and saw that its rules provide for a panel of
seven names to be given to the parties; each party strikes one name from the

how unconscious bias might result in a nondiverse arbitrator injecting inappropriate racial
stereotypes into a decision).
117. Offering a hypothetical can give a framework, as in this case, to see how
discrimination might occur within the thesis asserted. See, e.g., Laura T. Kessler, Employment
Discrimination and the Domino Effect, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1041, 1060–65 (2017)
(discussing a hypothetical).
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2018) (describing how employees must file timely a
charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC before receiving a right-to-sue letter,
which allows the employee to file a lawsuit in court within ninety days); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.28 (2019).
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panel until a final selection is made.119 The Company’s outside counsel
unsuccessfully requested that Triple H provide a panel of arbitrators
composed only of members of the National Association of Seriously
Esteemed Arbitrators (NASEA).
NASEA members must have written at least one hundred arbitration
awards and must be full-time neutrals not currently practicing law for either
employers or employees. NASEA’s membership consists of less than 5
percent women and less than 2 percent African American members. Triple
H responded with a panel of seven individuals who were not all NASEA
members. The Company’s outside counsel agreed to meet with Payne and
her lawyer to strike members from the list and agreed to go first, saying this
would leave the final strike for Payne.
The Triple H panel provided some minor biographical information about
each member of the panel, including self-identified race and gender.120 The
panel members and the parties’ selection process follows:
 Janet King, an African American, longtime civil rights activist, a
former EEOC attorney, the daughter of a famous civil rights leader
in the 1960s, and an arbitrator for ten years. Company’s first
strike.
 Paul Angst, a well-known, white, male arbitrator who has handled
hundreds of cases, former president of NASEA, and an arbitrator
for nearly fifty years. Payne’s first strike.
 Darnell Mason, a well-known, African American professor who
has taught undergraduate labor and industrial relations at State
University for the last fifteen years while also serving as a parttime arbitrator. Company’s second strike.
 Howard Hefty, another well-known, longtime, white, male
arbitrator and also a labor and employment law professor at
Prestigious University Law School for the last thirty years.
Payne’s second strike.
 Jane Starmore, a former National Labor Relations Board attorney,
who has been an arbitrator for the last ten years. Company’s third
strike.
 Harry Heckster, a former human resources manager for a major
food company, NASEA member, and an arbitrator for twenty-five
years. Payne’s third strike.
 William Worthy, a fifty-year-old white male, the same age and
race as Defending. Worthy worked previously in the public sector
119. This is the typical procedure for selecting an arbitrator. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N,
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES 15 (2009), https://
www.adr.org/sites/default/files/EmploymentRules_Web_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7QWB32H6] (providing that the parties in a AAA employment dispute may receive a list of
arbitrators and “strike names objected to” and submit the list “with remaining names in order
of preference”).
120. For the purposes of this hypothetical, we can assume that this self-reported
information is accurate.
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for a state agency on labor and employee relations matters before
becoming a full-time labor and employment arbitrator, a position
he has held for the last fifteen years.
Worthy has now become the selected arbitrator. But let us return to the
selection process. Payne struck Angst, Hefty, and Heckster. Do they have
anything in common? They are all men. We know that Angst and Hefty are
white. Angst, Hefty, and Heckster are very experienced and long-time
arbitrators. On the other side, the Company struck King, Mason, and
Starmore. What do they have in common? King and Mason are black.
Starmore and King are women. King and Starmore have worked for federal
agencies. Mason is an undergraduate professor and the only panelist who is
clearly a part-time arbitrator. Who are the lawyers in the group? King,
Starmore, and Hefty. From the information Triple H has provided, it is
uncertain whether others on the panel are current or former lawyers, judges,
or partners at law firms.
Assume Payne’s attorney has never had an arbitration with any of the
panelists.121 The Company’s attorney, on the other hand, has tried arbitration
cases with King, Angst, Hefty, Heckster, and Worthy as arbitrators.
Payne probably does not have any legal basis to challenge the selection.122
Would Payne lack of a legal basis to challenge if these were peremptory
challenges for jurors in court?123 The arbitrator panel Payne received
appeared to be somewhat diverse; the seven listed panelists included three
women and two African Americans. Moreover, what if the Company’s
attorney struck King first because, in a prior arbitration, she rejected the
attorney’s arguments and ruled against his client in a high-stakes
121. This highlights the difficulty for plaintiffs in employment arbitration when they are
not repeat players and the employer is a repeat player. See Chandrasekher & Horton, supra
note 38, at 35, 40 (discussing how repeat-player status doubly harms employees, who
experience worse arbitration results both when their employers are high-level repeat players
and when the employers are represented by repeat-player attorneys). Although the
hypothetical identifies an employment lawyer willing to represent Payne, it suggests the
attorney is not a repeat player in employment arbitration. Given how negative employment
arbitration results tend to be for employees, having an attorney provides some assistance. Id.
at 57 (noting that “pro se plaintiffs struggle mightily” in “AAA and JAMS employment
cases”). However, it is better if the attorney is also a repeat player because employees receive
added benefits when they have repeat-player plaintiffs’ lawyers. Id. at 58.
122. I acknowledged in 2005 that successful legal challenges to the selection of the
arbitrator based on race were unlikely. See Michael Z. Green, An Essay Challenging the
Racially Biased Selection of Arbitrators for Employment Discrimination Claims, 4 J. AM.
ARB. 1, 42 (2005). However, I suggested that a party might explore using 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
which prohibits discrimination based on race in the making and enforcement of agreements.
Id. at 45–49.
123. Federal courts require jurors to be selected from a fair cross section of the community.
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2018). Peremptory challenges of a juror based on race violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98–99 (1986).
Batson extends to peremptory challenges of a juror based on race in a civil matter. See
Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 614 (1991). See generally Sara Rudolph
Cole & E. Gary Spitko, Arbitration and the Batson Principle, 38 GA. L. REV. 1145 (2004)
(describing the regulation of discriminatory selection of jurors based on race and arguing for
similar regulation of nonconsensual discriminatory selection of arbitrators).
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employment discrimination case? What if the Company’s attorney struck
Mason and Starmore because he did not know them? Would those not be
legitimate reasons to strike? And, accordingly, would the Company’s
attorney not be acting in the best interest of his client? What if Payne
perceived the strikes by the Company’s attorney to be based on race and
gender? What if the Company’s attorney perceived Payne’s strikes to be
based on race, gender, and age?
When Worthy became the selected arbitrator, did race, gender, or age play
a role? If Mason had been included on ten separate panels in the last year
but was never selected—that is, if he repeatedly made it through the supply
side but was never hired on the demand side—does that affect concerns about
diversifying arbitral ranks?
Nothing suggests that Worthy may not be an excellent choice as the
selected arbitrator for this dispute. However, assume that, after the
arbitration hearing occurred and the parties submitted briefs on the matter,
Worthy found in favor of the Company. Worthy dismissed Payne’s
complaint under the rationale that she did not complain after Defending was
initially reprimanded.124 She failed to put the Company on notice that the
harassment continued.
Payne had repeatedly and unsuccessfully argued to Worthy that her initial
complaint should have been enough. Notwithstanding her complaint, she
continued to work directly for Defending and continued to be subjected to
his racist and sexist behavior. Payne also argued that, as an African
American, female engineer, she was in a unique position, as this field
employs very few women or African Americans.125 She knew if she
continued to complain, it would support stereotypical notions about women
and minorities in the field as being technically unsound, always too

124. Essentially, this raises the question of whether the Company had sufficient facts to
establish the Supreme Court’s Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense. See Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765
(1998). Generally, an employer may avoid liability if it can prove the two elements of the
Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense: “(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 765. Did Payne act reasonably in not reporting the alleged misdeeds of her
supervisor a second time after her first report did not result in sufficient corrective action? See,
e.g., EEOC v. Mgmt. Hosp. of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422, 437 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that a
reasonable juror would need to decide if the failure to contact a supervisor with an additional
complaint was reasonable when, after the first complaint, the supervisor failed to adequately
address the issue and the employee received harsher treatment).
125. See Adedamola Agboola, Study: Black Women Engineers Lack Role Models and
Experience Increased Bias in the Workplace, BLACK ENTERPRISE (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.blackenterprise.com/study-black-women-engineers-lack-role-models-andexperience-increased-bias-in-the-workplace/ [https://perma.cc/3HEZ-L2P7] (describing how
“[l]ess that 4% of engineering bachelor’s degrees are awarded to African American, Hispanic,
and Native American women” and how all the African American women studied experienced
gendered racism leading to isolation and unfair treatment).
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emotional or angry, and unable to really handle the challenges of the job.126
Worthy rejected Payne’s arguments and dismissed her discrimination claims.
This hypothetical highlights why this area is ripe with opportunity for
black ADR professionals. Employers must realize that the integrity of their
mandatory arbitration processes depends upon the availability and use of
minority arbitrators. Black workers need the perception and the reality that
diverse arbitrators have not been excluded on the basis of race or gender.
After this experience, might Payne believe that the arbitration process—and,
in particular, the arbitrator selection process—had been stacked against her?
Could Payne also reasonably believe the Company’s outside counsel
prevented the selection of any panelist with the background to possibly
appreciate or understand her arguments a little better? No matter how diverse
the arbitrator panels become, that result fails to remove the dilemma faced
by the parties’ representatives when selecting the arbitrator.
Attorneys for the Company operate as the gatekeepers. If risk-averse
reliance on known arbitrators helps their clients prevail, then the gatekeepers
may end up keeping out more diverse arbitrators. If the Company had agreed
to select Mason to promote diversity by giving a diverse arbitrator an
opportunity and the Company lost, this would not be a good situation for the
gatekeeper. As a result, this Article argues that the neutral service provider
should simply pick the arbitrator. If King had been randomly or arbitrarily
selected by the neutral service provider as the arbitrator for this dispute, the
Company’s gatekeeper would not be deemed at fault after the fact for that
selection, regardless of the final result. Instead, in having prior experience
with King as an arbitrator, the Company’s attorney could best inform his
client of the strengths and weaknesses of pursuing certain arguments in an
arbitration conducted by King. A neutrally provided selection would
represent a win-win result in addressing arbitrator diversity, while also
tackling the selection dilemma posed by risk aversion, as well as any hidden
or direct biases that may not be remedied in any other way.
III. ARBITRARY AND RANDOM ARBITRATOR SELECTION BY SERVICE
PROVIDERS
AAA’s mission and vision statement embraces “a shared commitment to
a diverse Roster of Arbitrators.”127 In line with that commitment, “AAA has
the ability in its algorithms to provide arbitrator lists to parties that comprise
at least 20% diverse panelists where party qualifications are met.”128 To
126. Concerns about an employer’s use of stereotypes can chill certain actions by
employees of color, which is sometimes referred to as “stereotype threat.” See Green, supra
note 3, at 651–52 (discussing the stereotype threat construct and how it can explain certain
behavior of workers who have been subjected to or are concerned about stereotypical
thinking).
127. See Roster Diversity & Inclusion, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://adr.org/RosterDiversity
[https://perma.cc/8HN5-DGAU] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
128. Id.; see also Jenkins, supra note 44 (providing commentary from the AAA council
chair who advocated for more diversity in ADR to match society’s diversity and explaining
that AAA has “recently created and implemented an innovative software tool in our system
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address the party selection problem, a neutral provider could go one step
further with the algorithm and select the arbitrator after the initial 20 percent
diverse panel is created. This final selection could be determined through a
random selection after the first step of the algorithm has created the diverse
panel. The suggestion that neutral service providers should decide who the
arbitrator will be is not a new concept; Sarah Cole mentioned the idea in
2017.129 Cole referred to consumer arbitration rules that allow AAA to
determine the arbitrator without party selection for claims of $10,000 or
less.130 Cole acknowledged that the $10,000 threshold was low and that
AAA did not have similar rules allowing it to select the arbitrator for matters
above that amount or for any other matters, including employment
disputes.131 According to Cole, if AAA and other service providers took the
approach of selecting the arbitrator, then their efforts to increase the diversity
of their panels would improve the diversity of arbitrators selected to resolve
the parties’ disputes.132
Unfortunately, as Cole noted, the parties could opt out of this arbitrator
appointment rule even if it was extended to employment disputes with a
much higher monetary threshold.133 However, most parties do not spend
much time spelling out the details of how they will select an arbitrator in their
agreements. Parties tend to rely on the procedures of neutral service
providers to do the heavy lifting of screening potential arbitrators by agreeing
that the rules of AAA, JAMS, CPR, or some other neutral service provider
will apply.134
To make arbitrator selection by the neutral service provider more of a
default rule, this Article asserts that it should become an agreed-upon
standard adopted by the “Employment Due Process Protocol” (the
“Protocol”).135 The Protocol is a joint agreement developed in 1995 by a
task force that included key stakeholders and neutral service providers and it
was aimed at encouraging the use of mediation and arbitration in employment
disputes, while establishing key procedural safeguards.136 Both AAA and
JAMS joined the Protocol and have issued important rules aimed at making
the use of their arbitration procedures fair.137 Both of these neutral service
providers have also adopted rules to cap fees, provide for comprehensive
which alerts our staff if at least 20 percent of the potential arbitrators on any given list are not
diverse from racial or gender perspectives”).
129. Cole, supra note 22, at 885–86 (noting that AAA is authorized to appoint the arbitrator
in cases of consumer arbitration claims of $10,000 or less).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 885 n.176 (describing the AAA process).
135. See Christopher A. Barreca et al., A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and
Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, NAT’L ACAD.
ARBITRATORS (May 9, 1995), https://naarb.org/due-process-protocol/ [https://perma.cc/
4QTG-JVAD].
136. Id.
137. See Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 38, at 15.
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discovery, and allow both parties to participate fairly and equally in the
selection of the arbitrator.138
The section of the Protocol on panel selection states:
Upon request of the parties, the designating agency should utilize a list
procedure such as that of the AAA or select a panel composed of an odd
number of mediators and arbitrators from its roster or pool. The panel cards
for such individuals should be submitted to the parties for their perusal prior
to alternate striking of the names on the list, resulting in the designation of
the remaining mediator and/or arbitrator.
The selection process could empower the designating agency to appoint a
mediator and/or arbitrator if the striking procedure is unacceptable or
unsuccessful. As noted above, subject to the consent of the parties, the
designating agency should provide the names of the parties and their
representatives in recent cases decided by the listed arbitrators.139

This Article suggests a friendly amendment to the above section, which
would replace the quoted language with the following:
Upon request of the parties, the designating agency shall appoint a mediator
and/or arbitrator. All appointed mediators or arbitrators will come from the
designated agency’s roster of neutrals with requisite skills and background
to act as the neutral in the dispute. The designated agency shall take
affirmative measures to keep a roster of diverse members on its
employment mediator and arbitrator panels. Each appointment of a
mediator or arbitrator shall be made randomly after ensuring requisite
concerns about diversity have been factored into the pool from which the
final selection is made. Upon selection by the agency of the arbitrator, the
parties may seek recusal of the arbitrator based upon any conflict of interest
or bias pursuant to the same standards as provided in the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct.

Once the parties choose to use one of the key neutral service providers who
are parties to this new Protocol, failing to allow the provider to select the
arbitrator for an employment dispute would constitute a violation of the
Protocol. As a result, the parties would not be able to use the key neutral
service providers to merely provide the parties with a panel. This new
provision allows the parties to seek recusal of the arbitrator selected if there
is bias or a conflict of interest subject to the same standards articulated in the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct.140 If recusal is appropriate, the neutral
service provider would select another arbitrator through the same initial

138. Id.
139. Employment Due Process Protocol, AM. ARB. ASS’N 4, https://www.adr.org/sites/
default/files/document_repository/Employment%20Due%20Process%20Protocol_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V47H-SWNF] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
140. See Dennis Rendelman, When Must a Judge Recuse Over a Personal Relationship?:
ABA Issues Ethics Guidance, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 5, 2019), http://www.abajournal.com/web/
article/judges-personal-relationships-formal-opinion-488
[https://perma.cc/U6PJ-WV35]
(discussing judicial recusal standards under the Model Code of Judicial Conduct); see also
Leslie Abramson, Specifying Grounds for Judicial Disqualification in Federal Courts, 72
NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1051–76 (1993) (describing the standards for judicial recusal).

2020]

ARBITRARILY SELECTING BLACK ARBITRATORS

2281

diversity step and then randomly select an arbitrator in the second step of the
algorithm.
This process would also resemble the way federal court judges are
randomly assigned to cases. As mentioned earlier, diversity in the judiciary
has been a concern for some time.141 This is particularly true in state courts,
where the appointment process has resulted in “class-based exclusivity or
racial or gender homogeneity.”142 In the federal court system, however,
judges are assigned randomly to a case.143 Generally, federal court judges
have been assigned to cases in an effort to provide neutrality and prevent the
probability of unfairness and the violation of due process.144 Current
practices regarding actual case and panel assignment in the federal courts
vary, but generally courts try to eschew outcome-oriented bias by some use
of random or blind case assignments and panel selections.145 This
assignment occurs through an electronic system managed by a clerk—“an
automated case assignment module.”146 To start the process of assigning a
judge, “the clerk creates electronic ‘decks,’ each of which corresponds to a
different category of cases, as specified by the court’s case assignment
procedures.”147 Depending on the judge’s probability of selection and ability
to handle the kind of case at issue, the clerk allocates “a certain number of
‘cards’ in each deck.”148 While not completely random, given the application
of some procedures before the random selection, the final assignment “is
chosen by a blind draw rather than being assigned by hand.”149 Most
importantly, the parties to the lawsuit do not have a way of knowing who the
judge will be in their case until the clerk assigns the judge.
One might question whether employer groups would want to give up their
right to select the arbitrator merely to improve the diversity of arbitrators
selected to handle employment disputes. Although some may view selection
of the arbitrator by the neutral service as an infringement on party autonomy,
as it removes arbitrator selection from the parties’ purview, the reality is that

141. Burt & Kaster, supra note 57, at 42–43, 46 n.3 (describing a study of racial and gender
diversity among judges).
142. Id.
143. See Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,
47–48 (2009).
144. See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the
Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1100–01 (2000).
145. As an example, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas uses
certain randomization in court assignments. See Special Order No. 3-334 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 18,
2019). Most cases, at least in the Dallas division, are assigned “by random draw” at a
distribution of 10 percent of civil cases and 12.5 percent of criminal cases to each district judge
who is not a senior judge. Id. The Fort Worth division of the same federal district court has a
similar random assignment process with a distribution of 30 percent for civil cases and 40
percent for criminal cases for each district judge who is not a senior judge. See Special Order
No. 3-336 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 26, 2019).
146. Alex Botoman, Note, Divisional Judge-Shopping, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 297,
311 (2018).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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employers and employees rarely choose an arbitrator on their own. The
parties rely on neutral service providers such as AAA and JAMS to vet those
who may be qualified to be selected as the arbitrator. These matters do not
involve repeat-player disputes, such as those between a union and an
employer, where the parties might agree on a permanent arbitrator or umpire
and bypass the use of a neutral service provider. As a result, the parties have
already given up much of their autonomy to neutral service providers.
Smaller employers, with low-wage employees who are more likely to be
subject to mandatory arbitration agreements without a broader commitment
to arbitrator diversity, will appreciate the transaction costs eliminated when
neutral service providers find and select arbitrators. These smaller
businesses cannot risk investing time and money in deciding to become
outliers by seeking arbitrators not committed to the new Protocol.150 Giving
the neutral service provider the final call is still a significant step. But it
follows from all the steps the parties have already taken in allowing neutral
service providers to develop pools and find diverse arbitrators.
Some parties may still believe that party autonomy should be adhered to;
those parties can choose to find an arbitrator through some other process and
without service providers who choose to follow the amended Protocol.
However, the parties who choose another method for arbitrator selection will
be outliers and subject to public pressure and backlash.151 Social movements
and bad publicity have started to play a role in driving corporate employer
behavior, regardless of whether there is a legal obligation. As an example,
in 2014, after “a flurry of negative press,” General Mills reversed its policy
of requiring any consumer who downloaded an online coupon for one of its
products to agree to mandatory arbitration of future claims and abdicate the
right to participate in a class action.152
Within the last two years, as the #MeToo movement has propelled more
women to come forward to identify objectionable behavior by powerful
persons in their workforces, employers have responded with more
transparency, fewer private settlements, and fewer nondisclosure
agreements.153 The #MeToo movement has also changed other aspects of
150. See E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers from
Legislation Invalidating Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 591, 648–49 (2009) (describing how smaller businesses are more risk averse and less
likely to be repeat players in arbitration given the costs of litigating disputes).
151. See Kathleen McCullough, Note, Mandatory Arbitration and Sexual Harassment
Claims: #MeToo- and Times Up-Inspired Action Against the Federal Arbitration Act, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 2653, 2683–85 (2019) (describing how social pressure and bad publicity
led several companies to voluntarily decide to end their mandatory arbitration agreements for
sexual harassment disputes and how some businesses, including Google and Airbnb, ended
the use of mandatory arbitration agreements for all employee disputes).
152. See Mark Guarino, General Mills Drops Arbitration Clause, but Such Contracts Are
“Pervasive,” CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 21, 2014), https://www.csmonitor.com/
Business/2014/0421/General-Mills-drops-arbitration-clause-but-such-contracts-arepervasive [https://perma.cc/HD4C-XW6P].
153. See Joan C. Williams & Suzanne Lebsock, Now What?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 2018),
https://hbr.org/cover-story/2018/01/now-what [https://perma.cc/GFJ5-D359] (discussing the
implications of #MeToo for the workplace).
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corporate behavior, pushing companies to no longer seek to enforce
arbitration agreements.154 Many high-profile companies such as Google and
Facebook, as well as a number of key law firms,155 have eliminated
arbitration clauses and other policies that may lead to private resolutions.156
Negative publicity induced other companies, including Microsoft, Uber,
Lyft, Airbnb, and eBay, to stop using arbitration for workplace sexual
misconduct.157 At this stage, businesses agreeing to abandon their arbitration
polices tend to be large companies and big law firms uniquely concerned
about negative publicity “due to the image they seek to project and the talent
they wish to attract.”158 These businesses also tend to be the kinds of entities,
espousing the value of diversity, that this Article aims to reach.159 If they
154. See, e.g., Matthew Weaver et al., Google Walkout: Global Protests After Sexual
Misconduct Allegations, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2018/nov/01/google-walkout-global-protests-employees-sexual-harassmentscandals [https://perma.cc/P8MT-RPWU] (describing job walkouts at Google, inspired by the
#MeToo movement, over the company’s arbitration and harassment policies and its response
to employee protests).
155. See Chris Villani, After Kirkland, Sidley Arbitration Flip, Group Eyes DLA Piper,
LAW360 (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1105619 [https://perma.cc/J5YV2U3X]. Many of these firms have also removed arbitration provisions from staff contracts.
See Karen Sloan, Kirkland & Ellis Backs Off Mandatory Arbitration for Staffers, LAW.COM
(Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/12/07/kirkland-ellis-backs-offmandatory-arbitration-for-staffers/ [https://perma.cc/RR3Q-WPZ9]. Much of the social
movement to get law firms to end the use of mandatory arbitration agreements began as a
response to law student protests related to the #MeToo movement. See Stephanie Ward, Parity
to the People, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2019, at 26, 27 (describing the People’s Parity Project, made up
of a group of law school students from Harvard, Georgetown, and Yale, which identified law
firms that use mandatory arbitration clauses and used social media and other forms of public
pressure, including seeking law school on-campus interviewing bans, to convince those firms
to stop using arbitration for sexual harassment and gender discrimination claims).
156. See Braden Campbell, Employers May Follow Tech Titans’ Lead on Arbitration,
LAW360 (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.law360.com/employment/articles/1102846/ [https://
perma.cc/U7G8-2TCW].
157. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Sexual Harassment and Solidarity, 87 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 56, 62 (2019).
158. See Anna M. Hersenberg & Molly O’Casey, When the Techs Go Marching In: An
Industry Updates Its Sexual Harassment Dispute Resolution Policy, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG., Feb. 2019, at 18, 27 (suggesting that the backlash inspired by #MeToo that
convinced tech companies and law firms to drop their mandatory arbitration policies might be
unique to those industries given their susceptibility to public pressure).
159. See Emily Gold Waldman, The Preferred Preferences in Employment Discrimination
Law, 97 N.C. L. REV. 91, 143–45 (2018) (discussing how diversity is good business for large
law firms, as large corporate clients including Facebook, MetLife, Microsoft, Hewlett
Packard, and Shell require diversity in the makeup of their legal representation); see also
Richard Feloni & Matt Turner, Walmart, IBM, Pepsico and 172 Other U.S. Companies Pledge
to Promote Diversity, INC. (June 12, 2017), https://www.inc.com/business-insider/walmartpepsico-ibm-diversity-ceo-action-diversity-inclusion.html [https://perma.cc/C9RF-72MN]
(identifying senior executives from 175 of the top U.S. businesses pledging their organizations
to diversity goals). Although businesses with low-wage workers may be more likely to subject
their employees to mandatory arbitration, see Colvin, supra note 31, at 16, this Article focuses
on businesses that already actively espouse the value of diversity (whether they have more
low-wage workers or not) even though their gatekeepers may not select diverse arbitrators.
Those employers should be sensitive to criticism of their diversity motives and any resulting
public backlash if they have already invested in making their commitments to diversity public.

2284

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

tend to break from the ranks of the new Protocol, the negative publicity
should make them rethink that position.160
As this Article has attempted to highlight, a key difficulty for corporate
entities committed to addressing arbitrator diversity arises when an
individual legal representative faces the ultimate decision of arbitrator
selection. The legal representative must give the client the best guidance on
how to prevail in the matter. At that point, lofty notions about leveraging
and appreciating diversity take a back seat as risk aversion and possible racial
bias, either open or unconscious, can lead to a focus on selecting known
arbitrators. This Article’s suggestion that the neutral service provider should
select the arbitrator randomly, just as a federal court would assign a judge,
takes the pressure off the legal representative. Ultimately, if the neutral
service provider selects the arbitrator, the employer’s attorney cannot be
blamed for making a poor arbitrator selection if the employer loses. The
tendency to pick a familiar and reliable arbitrator is thereby removed from
the selection process.
Instead, the most important selection criteria will be qualifications
involving experience in the types of disputes at issue and sufficient expertise
as an arbitrator. For example, AAA’s panel of employment arbitrators lists
the following qualification criteria that panelists must meet or exceed:
• Attorneys with a minimum of 10 years experience in employment law
with fifty (50) percent of your practice devoted to this field, retired judges,
or academics teaching employment law.
• Educational degree(s) and/or professional license(s) appropriate to your
field of expertise.
• Honors, awards and citations indicating leadership in your field.
• Training or experience in arbitration and/or other forms of dispute
resolution.
• Membership in a professional association(s).
• Other relevant experience or accomplishments (e.g. published articles).161

As another example, CPR’s specialty employment panel application asks the
following questions, with certain prefilled answers provided: (1) “What
percentage of your law practice or business for the last 10 years has been
employment-related”?; (2) “Have you had significant employment practice
in the last 10 years representing or working with the following”? (listing
“Management,” “Non-executive employees,” “Executives,” and “Other
(describe)” as prefilled answers); (3) “Have you had significant employment
practice in the last 10 years devoted to the following dispute processes”?
(listing “Litigation,” “Dispute Management (in house),” “Arbitration
160. See McCullough, supra note 151, at 2688–89 (suggesting that “social pressure on
corporations should not be underestimated” as a tool to address any unfairness with arbitration
given that a number of companies have changed their policies in light of criticism of
mandatory arbitration).
161. AAA Employment Arbitrator Qualification Criteria, supra note 90.
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(Neutral or Representative),” “Mediation (Neutral or Representative),”
“EEOC or other agency,” and “Other (describe)” as prefilled answers); and
(4) “Please provide a brief description of your employment case experience
as a neutral.”162
After these basic qualifications are met, the neutral service provider can
use algorithms that factor in diversity while randomly and arbitrarily
selecting the arbitrator to be assigned. Given that all the stakeholders
identified seemed to be concerned about diversity, this new selection process
offers a means to achieve more diverse arbitrator selection. Neutral service
providers should step up and make the last call in selecting the arbitrator.
The neutral provider’s selection of the arbitrator can help provide a
meaningful response to the long-standing arbitrator diversity concern.163
CONCLUSION
Given his public celebrity status, Jay-Z’s inquiry into the lack of black
arbitrators sparked a national conversation about the lack of diversity among
arbitrators.164 As one commentator noted, Jay-Z’s “star power” placed “a
10,000-watt spotlight on a long-standing issue.”165 As a result, those banging
the drum on behalf of the movement to enhance arbitrator diversity had
“someone with a huge audience and a lot of money at stake to propel the
issue into the headlines.”166 Kimberly Taylor, chief legal and operating
officer of JAMS, agreed: “Personally, I thought that if anybody had a voice
to highlight this issue it would be Jay-Z. It’s something we’ve been talking
about for a long time . . . and I thought that his particular viewpoint would be
something that’s helpful to the conversation.”167
Neutral service providers’ efforts to diversify their rosters, provide
networking opportunities, and encourage users to consider diversity when
making selections seem admirable. However, these diversity efforts “do not
seem sufficient to overcome the major obstacle facing any prospective
arbitrator on a roster—being selected.”168
Hence, Jay-Z’s inquiry
represented a real and valid concern. In the employment setting, no one
162. See Panelist Application, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL. 10,
https://www.cpradr.org/neutrals/New-Neutral-Application-Form
[https://perma.cc/EB2RMFBZ] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020); see also Become a Neutral, INT’L INST. CONFLICT
PREVENTION & RESOL., https://www.cpradr.org/neutrals/become-a-neutral [https://perma.cc/
AZQ9-P97N] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
163. See Pilawa, supra note 63, at 418 (highlighting the importance of arbitral institutions
taking the lead in making changes regarding arbitral diversity).
164. Helen Holmes, Jay-Z Halting His $204M Lawsuit Over a Lack of Black Arbitrators
Could Be Historic, OBSERVER (Nov. 29, 2018, 3:35 PM), https://observer.com/2018/11/jay-zhalts-lawsuit-black-arbitrators-historic/ [https://perma.cc/KP7Y-4JX4] (suggesting that JayZ’s involvement might be historic, while recognizing that “when arbitration agreements
coerce black employees into a private dispute resolution system where employers may apply
racial stereotypes with little regulation, it raises concern about the integrity of that system”
(quoting Green, supra note 122, at 4)).
165. Simson, supra note 6.
166. See Ricker, supra note 4, at 9.
167. Simson, supra note 6.
168. Cole, supra note 22, at 883.
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would accept a hiring process that would result in repeatedly picking a single,
racially stratified group: older white men. Yet everyone accepts that this is
a likely consequence of the arbitrator selection process given the current lack
of diversity when seeking to employ an arbitrator.
This Article proposes that service providers, all invested in the fairness of
their efforts to offer arbitrators in a manner that provides justice and does not
perpetuate systemic discrimination, should be given a greater role in the final
selection of the arbitrator. With certain diversity goals in place, these service
providers can select an arbitrator who is both more than qualified and diverse.
One of the ongoing flaws in the efforts aimed at increasing arbitrator
diversity is that current approaches continue to ignore the risk aversion
exhibited by the representatives selecting the arbitrators. No representative
is going to take the risk of selecting an arbitrator to resolve an important
dispute for a client solely because that arbitrator is diverse. That
representative is going to select the arbitrator with whom he or she has the
most familiarity, rather than risk be second-guessed by the client if the
arbitrator does not decide in the client’s favor. Unless the process of
arbitrator selection is changed, this risk-aversion principle will continue to
present a stifling concern for those seeking to increase arbitrator diversity,
regardless of how much the pool of diverse arbitrators is expanded.
This Article offers a new solution for all those who really want to increase
diversity among arbitrators and especially for those handling employment
discrimination disputes. Parties can require certain arbitrator qualifications
that focus on experience with employment dispute resolution and are not
limited to membership in elitist groups (former judges or partners at major
law firms). With those qualifications in mind and a new and updated
Protocol, with the three key service providers and other key constituents such
as national and local bar associations in agreement, the dispute resolution
service providers can use an algorithm to maximize diversity and then
randomly and arbitrarily select the arbitrator.
The final selection decision will not be placed at the feet of the risk-averse
representative who is concerned about being second-guessed when losing in
arbitration. By taking into account key qualifications and initial diversity
through a two-step algorithm, service providers can select and appoint
diverse arbitrators. This process resembles what happens in federal court
when parties file a lawsuit and the court provides the parties with an assigned
judge. This process of random and arbitrary selection provides a winning
response to the long-standing concern about arbitrator diversity that Jay-Z
fortunately shined a light on.

